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LINES ON A MAP: REGIONAL ORIENTATIONS AND UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
How do you win the peace? Since the United States-led Coalition's overwhelm-ing triumph in the decisive combat operations phase of the 2003 war against Iraq, the Coalition has been engaged in the monumental chore of securing victory in that country. Defeating a stubborn insurgency and establishing a secure environment remain key military tasks, but equally challenging civil requirements have emerged: reestablishing governance, restoring the infrastructure of society, improving Iraq's financial and economic well-being, and so on. These are tasks best led by agencies other than the military, organizations with expertise in diverse fields: foreign ministries, treasury and commerce departments, law enforcement and justice bureaus, education and health agencies. Moreover, because the security, governance, societal and economic needs are so closely intertwined, one cannot tackle the issues each in its own lane. There must be close collaboration among the agencies involved. When the United States Government has the lead, as it does in Iraq, this becomes an interagency challenge.
The thesis of this paper is built upon a straightforward logic chain: that the United States Government's interagency structures and processes are critical to our success in complex national security challenges (such as Iraq); that those processes and structures must therefore be as effective as we can make them; that they are not as effective today as they can and should be; and finally-distinguishing this study from many others-that a relatively simple yet powerful way of improving our interagency competency would be to more closely align the overseas regional orientations of our federal departments, agencies and bureaus.
MAKING THE CASE FOR CHANGE
It is beyond the scope of this paper to reargue the front end of that logic chain. Some of these elements seem common sense (interagency coordination is important, and should be as effective as possible), while others have already been skillfully argued in other places. In the latter category, the case that the United States interagency process can be-and frequently isso dysfunctional that it hinders, or even prevents, the accomplishment of U.S. strategic and national objectives has already been made, repeatedly, by sources from all corners of the United States Government, academia, and the media. 1 The fact is that our experience over the past two years in Iraq is simply the open window that allowed light to flood in and expose the problem widely.
Nor is it the purpose of the author to propose an exhaustive menu of wide-sweeping proposals to completely revamp, or even reinvent, the U.S. interagency process and structure.
Again, such proposals already exist. 2 Rather, the intent here is to introduce and explore the merits of one narrowly-focused change in the way that the interagency is structured and operates, a change that has the potential to yield benefits far out of proportion to its scope.
Interagency shortfalls may very well interfere with the resolution of all complex issues that face our government, but this paper will not attempt to address domestic policy areas. It is when the lack of interagency cooperation involves matters of national security that the risk to our country is at its greatest. Thus, the interagency process most deserves scrutiny where it engages in national security policy formulation and execution.
While it would be useful to apply this study across all departments, agencies and other organizations that contribute to the U.S. national security policymaking process, such breadth would require a book rather than a research paper. Instead, we focus on the five members of the interagency community with membership or advisory positions in the National Security
Council: the National Security Council staff, the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Given their critically important roles in the Global
War on Terrorism, we also look at the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Several of these seven departments, agencies and bureaus divide the globe into regions so they can better manage their activities around the world. It is obvious that the way each agency organizes its global affairs not only impacts how it sees the world and applies programs and policies, but also affects how it interacts with the other agencies. The thesis of this paper is that an alignment of the regional orientations of these offices would provide an interagency synergy that might dramatically outweigh the cost each pays in giving up the autonomy to draw its own lines on the map.
DRAWING FREEHAND
As implied in the introduction, there is no single answer to the question, "How does the United States Government view the world today?" Rather, there are several, one for each department or agency involved in international affairs. That is not really surprising, given the varying roles of the organizations and their cultures. It may surprise the reader, though, to learn that no two departments or agencies agree even on something so basic as a regional framework for the globe. One might suppose that most would simply borrow the State Department's regional structure-State is, after all, the United States Government's lead for international affairs-but none do. Each draws its own lines on the map and regionalizes the world in its own way, making interagency collaboration a game akin to matching up patchwork quilts.
The staff of the National Security Council (NSC), under the leadership of the National Security Advisor, has the vitally important role within the interagency process of coordinating the activities of the various federal departments and agencies in pursuit of national security. How the NSC staff views the globe has an obvious impact on the interagency process, so it is important to understand that staff's organization.
While it is impossible from the NSC's organization chart (figure 1) to discern a country-by- The Department of Homeland Security, with its focus on the internal defense of the United States, has no regional framework for the world beyond our borders. Such structure simply is not needed by the department. 9 Nor has an overseas regional structure been required in the past by the FBI. This need may be emerging with the Bureau's increased role in international security matters, particularly as they pertain to trans-national terrorism, but thus far the organization's Counter-Terrorism Division has only two regional cells: a Middle East Unit, and a Global (read, the rest of the world outside the U.S.) Unit. 10 For the purposes of this study, that is not significantly different from having no regional structure at all. The Bureau does have some forty-five Legal Attaches (LEGATS) assigned around the globe, but these attaches do not ascribe to a strict regional structure. In summary, five of the seven agencies with the most significant roles in national security affairs have regional structures for dealing with the world. Each has its own way of looking at the globe as summarized in the following chart ( figure 6 ). Notably, the cross-agency mapping of this diagram is only very roughly approximate, as a host of FIGURE 6: COMPARISON OF DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS' REGIONAL STRUCTURES country-by-country differences exist along the regional borders. In other words, the reality of the comparison is even more confusing and intertwined than is displayed here.
One tentative conclusion can be drawn from study of this chart: it appears that Treasury and the CIA are in fact mirroring, to some degree, the organization of State Department. They have simplified and merged State's six regions into two (Treasury) or three (CIA), perhaps to reduce bureaucratic overhead and personnel requirements, but the mapping seems clean.
Thus the true challenge of interagency regional cooperation exists among the top three players in national security affairs: NSC, State and Defense. Accordingly, the remainder of this study will focus on these three organizations.
HERE THERE BE DRAGONS
Why the cacophony? How did our government grow into this state of worldview inconsonance, particularly among three key agencies that must work so closely together? The answer derives from the variance in cultures, functions, autonomy, resourcing levels, and responsibilities among the organizations. Let us begin by trying to understand why each of the three drew lines on the map as it did. NSC (7 Regions) State (6) Defense (5) Treasury (2) CIA ( Hemisphere. Each of these changes was initiated in a different way, but all were studied, staffed and decided in a similar manner.
Importantly, as both interviewed State Department officials noted, most decisions to reorient the State map involve both internal (administrative/management) and external (geopolitical, societal) considerations. 13 "These changes are driven by a combination of policy and administrative rationales. There is a diplomatic aspect involved as well-when Canada heard that it was being shifted to Western Hemisphere, it was not happy." 14 The regional orientation of the Department of Defense is roughly as flexible as that of State, but seems less driven by administrative/management considerations. At the same time, the Defense review process is far more formalized than State's. It is set by the Unified Command Plan (UCP). 15 The UCP is amended frequently (twenty times since 1946, thrice in the past three years), sometimes in major ways-such as the creation of a new Combatant
Command. Most often, though, the changes are relatively minor: shifting a particular set of missions from one geographic Combatant Commander to another, or responsibility for a single country between commands . Unfortunately, this constant tinkering makes it nearly impossible to establish a holistic explanation for why Defense currently organizes the globe as it does.
What can be discerned is that the Joint Staff continually reviews the UCP for changes that will make the Defense Department's operations overseas more effective or efficient: "The geographic boundaries are set in a way that makes sense to us for political, military, cultural sorts of reasons." 16 In fact, these three key members of the interagency community have one important similarity in their approaches: each adjusts its regional framework to best fit its roles and missions in pursuit of national security. The problem is that each does so unilaterally, without Contrast the interagency challenges of the first two examples with the final string: JapanSouth Korea-North Korea-China. Again the historic links and potential animosities are obvious.
In this string, however, there is interagency unity across the board. All four nations are within the portfolio of the NSC Director for Asian Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, and the Defense Department's PACOM Commander. Interagency cooperation and coherence in this example is bound to be much higher than in either of the previous examples, as the three agencies' staffs have unity of effort and unfettered ability to coordinate between themselves without the additional burden of intra-departmental coordination across seams.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
As may have become obvious in the previous section, the complications of interagency coordination multiply as seams are introduced within departments. All other factors being equal, an Assistant Secretary of State who has perhaps two NSC Directors and three geographic Combatant Commanders to coordinate with will be less effective at the interagency level than his or her peer who is perfectly mapped to a single NSC Director and only one Combatant
Commander. The same is true of each geographic Combatant Commander and NSC Director: simplicity leads to effectiveness, while complexity engenders incoherence and friction. Further, these challenges of working together at the executive level are replicated countless times within those key leaders' staffs, as military action officers, foreign service officers and NSC desk officers engage one another. And this massively complex interweaving of inter-relationships must be reestablished from scratch every three to four years, as key leaders and staff officers constantly rotate. 18 How much simpler and more effective the interagency process could be if these schisms were eliminated. But what are the direct and indirect costs associated with such a change, and do the benefits outweigh those costs? The answer is yes, but first let us consider the costs.
One clear cost, already mentioned, is that the departments would no longer have the freedom to draw lines on their own maps to best fit their parochial duties. If the Defense Department were to adapt to the State Department regional structure, for instance, the CENTCOM Commander would no longer be able to divorce himself from responsibility for U.S.
policies toward Israel when interacting with his or her regional military counterparts. Though it is well beyond the scope of this paper to outline all the potential costs to each department and agency of unifying an interagency regional structure-and it is important to note that the costs could only be determined after a framework is decided upon-one must acknowledge that such costs exist.
Another, more literal, cost is the reorganization required of all (or all but one) of the departments once a framework is set. Staff have to be reassigned, hired and fired; offices must be established or torn down; whole organizations have to be created or disbanded. This can be very expensive , 19 but not prohibitively so. It certainly should not be considered a valid reason for blocking improved interagency cooperation.
A second-or third-order cost to any reorganization would be the creation of a new set of government-wide seams. As every baseball player or military leader knows, any time a line is drawn on the ground and responsibility divvied out for the terrain on either side of it, a seam has been created where coordination and coherence is bound to be weaker than inside either of the adjacent zones. It is human nature to let the other person worry about his or her side of the line.
Unfortunately, what happens on the line itself-or very near it-becomes a bit of a blind spot to both players/leaders, unless they go out of their way to integrate their efforts with their neighbors.
To some extent, though it is undoubtedly rarely a conscious effort, the fact that many seam. This fictitious example is an over-simplification of reality, but there is undoubtedly some cross-governmental benefit to the patchwork nature of our current regional orientations.
None of these costs, even taken together, appear to outweigh the prodigious and obvious benefits to be gained by rationalizing our regional frameworks across the interagency community. More importantly, this evolution could bring immeasurable relief to the interagency traffic jam so commonly reported and bemoaned in recent decades. It is the right idea, and is worth the associated costs.
SHARING ONE MAP: A MODEST PROPOSAL
This study would be incomplete without some recommended solution, or way ahead, though it would be premature to introduce a full-blown map complete with new lines drawn upon it. Before any interagency regional structure can be decided upon, the key agencies involved must be brought together to argue their cases for the grouping, or separation, of specific countries with and from each other. The department-by-department costs associated with each pairing or separation must be weighed against a similar department-by-department measure of the benefits to be gained. The fact is that one can draw a single line connecting all 190-odd countries on the globe and link them each to the other as important neighbors; regionalization involves difficult and nuanced decisions of relative merit. This can not be done by each agency in isolation, unless one is happy with the interagency situation as it currently exists.
The proposal of this paper is much more modest, and yet more enduring. It begins with a presidential decision (codified through a National Security Policy Directive or similar document) that directs the key departments and agencies to empower representatives to make decisions on behalf of their departments, then-under NSC staff lead-sequestering those representatives to iron out a regional framework that all will live by. It includes presidential or congressional introduction of a bill (an executive order is not enduring enough) that makes it a requirement of United States law that all agencies of the government with national security responsibilities adhere to the regional framework so decided, and that the same process be used from time to time to adjust the regional structure in light of world events. In short, the recommendation is for a UCP-like process for creation and maintenance of an interagency regional world framework that is embedded in U.S. code.
The basic concept is not truly novel. In Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N), 20 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) principle author Clark Murdock proposes a regiondefining world map "that [is] common to all U.S. government agencies." 21 The BG-N study, however, mentions the interagency-wide map only as a point of introduction for a far-ranging restructuring of the interagency community, including such significant changes as creating two additional geographic Combatant Commands. The simpler recommendations of this paper can provide many of the benefits of BG-N's vastly more ambitious project at significantly lower cost.
Further, this paper leaves it to the interagency players themselves to collectively redefine the map, as well as how and whether their departments and agencies should restructure after the lines are redrawn. The BG-N study charts a course for the interagency community up front, taking away the vast potential for buy-in that often accompanies giving the participants a say in their own futures. This is not a complex proposal, because the situation does not demand complexity. It in fact demands simplicity of the sort that is rare in the interagency community. This paper addresses one very narrow element of the interagency world, but one that could potentially reap substantial benefits well beyond its own scope. There is real power in getting our departments and agencies into the habit of working together. Getting them all on the same map would be a significant move in that direction.
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